Ethics Governance
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| Article - Abstract. To view full article click on the article title. | |
eMJA: Schiff, Posthumous conception and the need for consent Posthumous conception and the need for consent. We should require prior consent to safeguard the interests of the deceased MJA 1999; 170: 53-54 The spectre of a bereaved family member attempting to cope with the tragic death of a loved one by harvesting the deceased's gametes for procreative purposes is indeed a moving one. But sympathy alone should not inform law and public policy. Rather, we need to grapple with the complex moral issues emerging from the advent of medical techniques that, for the first time in history, have made posthumous conception a reality. Any attempt to formulate a coherent ethical framework in this area must be sensitive to the many interests at stake. In addition to considering the grieving family member's desire to produce a child, policymakers must identify and evaluate other important interests. For example, protecting the psychological well-being of the resulting child should receive serious attention. Might the child be adversely affected by being knowingly denied access to one biological parent? Also, the interests of the deceased's family are important, as posthumous conception of a child will probably have enduring emotional, psychological and financial implications for the family. However, the issue most easily overlooked, as the dead have no voice, concerns the interests of the deceased. Specifically, what significance ought to be afforded the deceased's interests when we have little or no evidence regarding his or her wishes for, or objections to, posthumous procreation? Some may claim that we cannot speak sensibly of the dead as having "interests" which can be "harmed" by the conduct of surviving parties because, once a person dies, that individual no longer has any interests and therefore concepts of "harm" or "benefit" are inapposite.1 It is clear, though, that certain acts committed after a person's death can either harm or promote that individual's interests. Full Article: http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/jan18/schiff/schiff.html |
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2006 Ethics-Governance.com |
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